La propuesta que se presenta en este artículo tiene como objetivo principal establecer una coordinación evaluativa de las materias de los diferentes cursos impartidos en el Bachillerato de la Enseñanza del Inglés (BEI) de la Escuela de Literatura y Ciencias del Lenguaje (ELCL) de la Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica (UNA). Esta propuesta de Evaluación Integral tiene el fin de lograr un vínculo entre los instructores, objetivos de los cursos y el aprendizaje del idioma per se. La evaluación integral busca (...) que los aprendices del idioma inglés puedan ver la correlación del idioma de una manera cíclica y no aislada. En otras palabras, que el estudio de la gramática, fonética, cultura, la expresión y producción oral y escrita estén vinculadas entre sí a través de trabajos en común (proyectos) que contribuyan a la formación académica y que contribuyan al aprendizaje. Esto requiere de un estudio profundo de los planes de estudios, de los temas y objetivos y de la comunicación permanente de los académicos. La idea es establecer dicha propuesta como un eje transversal de trabajo permanente, y que se establezca como una actividad de enseñanza para los alumnos en cada ciclo lectivo en su respectivo nivel. (shrink)

Group polarization—roughly, the tendency of groups to incline towards more extreme positions than initially held by their individual members— has been rigorously studied by social psychol- ogists, though in a way that has overlooked important philosophical questions about this phenomenon which remain unexplored. Two such salient questions are metaphysical and epistemological, respectively. From a metaphysical point of view, can group polarization, understood as an epistemic feature of a group, be reduced to epistemic features of its individual members? Relatedly, from an (...) epistemological point of view, is group polarization best understood as a kind of cognitive bias or rather in terms of intellectual vice? This book taxonomizes this possibility space by comparing four models which combine potential answers to the metaphysical and epistemological questions. The models we consider are: group polarization as a collective bias, a summation of individual epistemic vices; a summation of individual biases; and a collective epistemic vice. We defend a collective vice model of group polarization over the competing alternatives. (shrink)

Winning a lottery, being hit by a stray bullet, or surviving a plane crash, all are instances of a mundane phenomenon: luck. Mundane as it is, the concept of luck nonetheless plays a pivotal role in central areas of philosophy, either because it is the key element of widespread philosophical theses or because it … Continue reading Luck →.

We propose a view of identity beyond the individual in what we call interpersonal interidentities (IIIs). Within this approach, IIIs comprise collections of entangled stabilities that emerge in recurrent social interaction and manifest for those who instantiate them as relatively invariant though ever-evolving patterns of being (or more accurately, becoming) together. Herein, we consider the processes responsible for the emergence of these IIIs from the perspective of an enactive cognitive science. Our proposal hinges primarily on the development of two related (...) notions: enhabiting and coenhabiting. First, we introduce the notion of enhabiting, a set of processes at the individual level whereby structural interdependencies stabilise and thereafter undergird the habits, networks of habits, and personal identities through which we make sense of our experience. Articulating this position we lean on the notion of a tendency towards an optimal grip, though offering it a developmental framing, whereby iterative states of selective openness help realise relatively stable autonomous personal identities with their own norms of self-regulation. We then extend many of the notions found applicable here to an account of social coenhabiting, in particular, we introduce the notion of tending towards a co-optimal grip as central to the development of social habits, networks of habits, and ultimately IIIs. Such structures, we propose, also emerge as autonomous structures with their own norms of self-regulation. We wind down our account with some reflections on the implications of these structures outside of the interactions wherein they come into being and offer some thoughts about the complex animations of the individual embodied subjects that instantiate them. (shrink)

This paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreement simpliciter. We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a norm of disagreement on which what one should do when faced with a disagreeing (...) party is to improve the epistemic properties of one’s doxastic attitude or, alternatively, hold steadfast. (shrink)

El presente artículo comienza reconstruyendo la recepción textual y el interés por Maquiavelo a cargo de Antonio Gramsci. A continuación, las dos partes que componen el trabajo buscan ofrecer una exposición del modo, originalidad y consecuencias según las cuales Gramsci interpreta a Maquiavelo, por un lado, en su especificidad histórica, y, por otro, como un teórico político que ofrece aplicaciones tácticas y estratégicas. A través de diversos temas, como la formación del Estado-nación, el precoz jacobinismo de Maquiavelo, la relación entre (...) clase dirigente y masas o las consideraciones sobre la constitución económica de la URSS, mostramos las formas en que Maquiavelo aparece en la obra de Gramsci, qué significa la presencia de florentino en diferentes momentos de la misma y cómo dialoga con el resto del universo conceptual gramsciano. (shrink)

A notorious objection to robust virtue epistemology—the view that an agent knows a proposition if and only if her cognitive success is because of her intellectual virtues—is that it fails to eliminate knowledge-undermining luck. Modest virtue epistemologists agree with robust virtue epistemologists that if someone knows, then her cognitive success must be because of her intellectual virtues, but they think that more is needed for knowledge. More specifically, they introduce independently motivated modal anti-luck principles in their accounts to amend the (...) problem of eliminating luck—this makes their views instances of impure virtue epistemology. The aim of the paper is to argue, firstly, that such a move lacks adequate motivation; secondly, that the resulting impure accounts equally fail to handle knowledge-undermining luck. On a more positive note, these results bolster a more orthodox virtue-theoretic approach to knowledge that assigns a fundamental explanatory role to the notion of ability. In this sense, the paper also sketches an account of ability and a corresponding account of knowledge that explains how success from ability is incompatible with success from luck. (shrink)

Functionalism as a philosophical position has been recently applied to the case of emotion research. However, a number of objections have been raised against applying such a view to scientific theorizing on emotions. In this article, I argue that functionalism is still a viable strategy for emotion research. To do this, I present functionalism in philosophy of mind and offer a sketch of its application to emotions. I then discuss three recent objections raised against it and respond to each of (...) them. These objections claim that functionalism is intractable because (i) it does not support a scientifically interesting taxonomy of emotions for experimental settings, (ii) it is inherently teleological, and (iii) it cannot be falsified. I argue that these objections either rely on a simplified version of functionalism as a philosophical position or they pose challenges that functionalists can readily address. Lastly, I conclude by drawing some lessons these objections suggest for a tractable functionalist account of emotions. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar que en la actualidad el dominio de la técnica sobre la naturaleza tiene consecuencias en la conformación de la subjetividad. Para comprender este dominio, la dialéctica negativa analiza las tensiones entre el mito y la razón, para señalar las oposiciones del sujeto en su relación con la sociedad. La dominación causa sufrimiento en el sujeto, lo que se refleja en su interacción con los objetos y en la conformación de su moralidad.

Can subjective, individual taste be reconciled with an objective, universal standard? In _Homo Aestheticus,_ Luc Ferry argues that this central problem of aesthetic theory is fundamentally related to the political problem of democratic individualism. Ferry's treatise begins in the mid-1600s with the simultaneous invention of the notions of taste and modern democracy. He explores the differences between subjectivity and individuality by examining aesthetic theory as developed first by Kant's predecessors and then by Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and proponents of the avant-garde. (...) Ferry discerns two "moments" of the avant-garde aesthetic: the hyperindividualistic iconoclasm of creating something entirely new, and the hyperrealistic striving to achieve an extraordinary truth. The tension between these two, Ferry argues, preserves an essential element of the Enlightenment concern for reconciling the subjective and the objective—a problem that is at once aesthetic, ethical, and political. Rejecting postmodern proposals for either a radical break with or return to tradition, Ferry embraces a postmodernism that recasts Enlightenment notions of value as a new intersubjectivity. His original analysis of the growth and decline of the twentieth-century avant-garde movement sheds new light on the connections between aesthetics, ethics, and political theory. (shrink)

La invocación a la diosa Venus en el proemio al libro primero del De rerum natura es uno de los más memorables en la historia de la literatura, así como uno de los más inquietantes en la historia de los textos que niegan todo influjo divino en los asuntos humanos. El presente trabajo busca hallar en la presencia de la diosa Venus a lo largo de todo el poema una dimensión ordenadora que la distinguiría de cualquier entidad divina tradicional. Proponemos, (...) pues, que nuestra diosa personifica el _ordenamiento_ de la naturaleza y la reintegración del orden social al orden natural. El _filósofo_ Lucrecio, en su lucha contra la divinidad, presenta a Venus como un elemento que expresa una racionalización del universo en términos políticos. Para sustentar nuestra hipótesis, hemos accedido al latín de Lucrecio para identificar en él conceptos de la política romana asociados indiscutiblemente al gobierno de la naturaleza, que nuestra diosa preside. (shrink)

What is the nature of knowledge? A popular answer to that long-standing question comes from robust virtue epistemology, whose key idea is that knowing is just a matter of succeeding cognitively—i.e., coming to believe a proposition truly—due to an exercise of cognitive ability. Versions of robust virtue epistemology further developing and systematizing this idea offer different accounts of the relation that must hold between an agent’s cognitive success and the exercise of her cognitive abilities as well as of the very (...) nature of those abilities. This paper aims to give a new robust virtue epistemological account of knowledge based on a different understanding of the nature and structure of the kind of abilities that give rise to knowledge. (shrink)

This essay explains the notion of luck in terms of risk. It starts by distinguishing two senses of risk, the risk that an event has of occurring and the risk at which an agent is with respect to an event. It cashes out the former in modal terms and the latter in terms of lack of control. It then argues that the presence or absence of event-relative risk marks a distinction between two types of luck or fortune commonly overlooked in (...) ordinary usage of the terms “luck” and “fortune.” After offering a detailed account of the notion of control, the essay advances a new version of the so-called lack of control account of luck: lucky events are events with respect to which one is at risk and hence events over which one lacks control in the specified way. Finally, it argues that its account steers clear of counterexamples to the lack of control account of luck. (shrink)

In “Knowledge Under Threat” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2012), Tomas Bogardus proposes a counterexample to the safety condition for knowledge. Bogardus argues that the case demonstrates that unsafe knowledge is possible. I argue that the case just corroborates the well-known requirement that modal conditions like safety must be relativized to methods of belief formation. I explore several ways of relativizing safety to belief-forming methods and I argue that none is adequate: if methods were individuated in those ways, safety would fail (...) to explain several much-discussed cases. I then propose a plausible externalist principle of method individuation. On the one hand, relativizing safety to belief-forming methods in the way suggested allows the defender of safety to account for the cases. On the other hand, it shows that the target known belief of Bogardus’s example is safe. Finally, I offer a diagnosis of a common error about the kind of cases that are typically considered potential counterexamples to the necessity of the epistemic condition: proponents of the alleged counterexamples mistake a strong condition that I call super-safety for safety. (shrink)

Las cada vez más álgidas investigaciones en torno a la naturaleza de la conciencia contrastan con una pérdida de interés en la noción de vida o en la delimitación conceptual de un organismo vivo. También contrastan, bien para refutar o adherirse, con la asunción de un modelo racional acabado y matemático del mundo reflejado en el predominio de propiedades medibles por sobre cualidades más sensibles de las cosas. El tratamiento del placer y la conciencia en Aristóteles y Husserl parece restaurar (...) y subvertir, respectivamente, modelos relegados y no tan relegados: en el primer caso, la noción de vida y actividad; en el segundo, el esquema de una razón teórica neutral. (shrink)

Previous research suggests a strong association of health indicators with self-report ability emotional intelligence and self-report mixed EI, but a weak or moderate association with performance-based ability EI measures. The size of the association for ability EI may be inaccurately estimated, because there has not been enough research on the relationship of ability EI to health outcomes to allow moderator analyses in meta-analyses. Therefore the present review aimed to synthesize results specifically from studies on the relationship of performance-based ability EI (...) with depression and well-being across adult populations in different settings. We found that maximum-performance measures of ability EI are associated negatively with depression and positively with well-being, and that these associations are moderated and mediated by several factors, including gender and self-report EI. Our analysis highlights limitations in the evidence base and leads to recommendations for future research and for ability EI-based training programs. (shrink)

This essay explains the notion of luck in terms of risk. It starts by distinguishing two senses of risk, the risk that an event has of occurring and the risk at which an agent is with respect to an event. It cashes out the former in modal terms and the latter in terms of lack of control. It then argues that the presence or absence of event-relative risk marks a distinction between two types of luck or fortune commonly overlooked in (...) ordinary usage of the terms “luck” and “fortune.” After offering a detailed account of the notion of control, the essay advances a new version of the so-called lack of control account of luck: lucky events are events with respect to which one is at risk and hence events over which one lacks control in the specified way. Finally, it argues that its account steers clear of counterexamples to the lack of control account of luck. (shrink)

In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heterogeneous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this article, I analyze this claim—which I call the Variability Thesis—and argue that as it stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues regarding (...) the logical structure of the claim. On the other hand, and most importantly, I show that the Variability Thesis requires a consensus about what counts as a relevant pattern of response in different domains, a consensus that is lacking in the current literature. This makes it difficult to assess what counts as evidence for or against this thesis. As a result, arguments based on the Variability Thesis are unwarranted. This raises serious concerns about some current empirical theories of emotions, but also sheds light on the issue of the scientific status of emotion categories. (shrink)

En muchas lenguas las cláusulas adverbiales iniciales presentan una repetición del predicado de la oración anterior, lo que se conoce como enlace tail-head. Este trabajo busca describir las construcciones de eth del quichua santiagueño de acuerdo con dos parámetros: a) el grado de solapamiento semántico entre los predicados de la construcción de eth, y b) el grado de integración eventiva de la adverbial inicial con la cláusula principal. El primer parámetro permite identificar construcciones verbatim –con repetición exacta del verbo anterior– (...) y no verbatim –sin repetición exacta–. El segundo parámetro se manifiesta en la forma que adopta la cláusula “cabeza”. Así, se identificaron, por un lado, una forma converbal y, por el otro, cláusulas con los sufijos del sistema de conmutación de la referencia. La interacción entre estos dos parámetros muestra que las diferentes construcciones de eth poseen diversas funciones discursivas, en particular para la coherencia temática. (shrink)

Resumen: En muchas lenguas las cláusulas adverbiales iniciales presentan una repetición del predicado de la oración anterior, lo que se conoce como enlace tail-head. Este trabajo busca describir las construcciones de eth del quichua santiagueño de acuerdo con dos parámetros: a) el grado de solapamiento semántico entre los predicados de la construcción de eth, y b) el grado de integración eventiva de la adverbial inicial con la cláusula principal. El primer parámetro permite identificar construcciones verbatim -con repetición exacta del verbo (...) anterior- y no verbatim -sin repetición exacta-. El segundo parámetro se manifiesta en la forma que adopta la cláusula “cabeza”. Así, se identificaron, por un lado, una forma converbal y, por el otro, cláusulas con los sufijos del sistema de conmutación de la referencia. La interacción entre estos dos parámetros muestra que las diferentes construcciones de eth poseen diversas funciones discursivas, en particular para la coherencia temática.: In many languages preposed adverbial clauses repeat the previous verb or predicate, which phenomenon has been termed tail-head linkage. This paper aims to describe THL constructions in Santiagueño Quichua according to two parameters: a) the degree of semantic overlap between the predicates of the THL constructions, and b) the degree of event integration of the preposed adverbial with its main clause. The first parameter allows the identification of verbatim constructions -with exact repetition of the previous predicate- and non verbatim constructions -without exact repetition-. The second parameter manifests itself in the form the head clause might adopt, where it is a converb or it takes switch reference suffixes. The interplay of both parameters shows that the different THL constructions possess diverse discourse functions, particularly regarding thematic coherence. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es a nalizar el Dialogo Social y el Tripartismo en Venezuela, explanando los distintos elementos que conforman cada uno de estos conceptos, al mismo tiempo se presentan los antecedentes del proceso de diálogo social y tripartismo en Venezuela. La metodología utilizada se encuentra enmarcada en una investigación tipificada como aplicada, documental y descriptiva, se tipificó el diseño de la investigación bibliográfico, las técnicas e instrumentos de recolección de datos utilizados fueron la selección y verificación de (...) documentación escrita. De los resultados se desprende que las funciones del dialogo social, pueden observarse desde distintas perspectivas, para lograr consensos, para a través de la discusión puedan evitarse situaciones de conflicto, para debatir en torno a temas vinculados a lo económico, laboral y social. Hoy en día en la Ley Orgánica del Trabajo, los trabajadores, y las trabajadoras queda excluida la participación de la Comisión Tripartita Nacional, y por ende, toda intervención en la toma de decisiones o recomendaciones en virtud de la fijación del salario minino. Es la razón por la cual, se sostiene el hecho de que son necesarios estos mecanismos de concertación para crear una sociedad justa y democrática. (shrink)

This text is an artistic political friction and therefore its intention is to be a manifesto. It follows Donna Haraway’s thought in its character of situated experience and knowledge, the narrative voice is of the singular creatures that question the interactions with the earth as soil and the plants, as well as the hybrids and the grafts in their contradictions and liminal character in the history of agricultural technology and of the domestication of the earth/soil. It is an approach to (...) the notion nosótrica of the earth/soil, coming from the language Tojol’ab’al of the Indigenous people of Mexico and the meaning of knowing how to listen, studied by Carlos Lenkersdorf. (shrink)

This is an introduction to the volume The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (Routledge, forthcoming), (eds.) F. Broncano-Berrocal and J.A. Carter.

An explanatorily powerful approach to the modal dimension of knowledge is Robert Nozick’s idea that knowledge stands in a tracking relation to the world. However, pinning down a specific modal condition has proved elusive. In this paper, I offer a diagnosis and a positive proposal. The root of the problem, I argue, is the unquestioned assumption that tracking is a matter of directly preserving conformity between what is believed and what is the case in certain possible worlds. My proposal is (...) that what we track is whether the conditions for belief formation are appropriate in such worlds. Accordingly, we indirectly track the truth by ensuring that we only use our methods of belief formation in conditions that make it likely that conformity is preserved between what is believed and what is the case. (shrink)

The main lesson from Gettier cases is that while one cannot know a proposition by luck, one can hold a lucky true belief justifiedly. Possibly because the latter is taken for granted, the relationship between epistemic justification and epistemic luck has been less discussed. The paper investigates whether luck can undermine doxastic justification, and if so, how and to what extent. It is argued that, as in the case of knowledge, beliefs can fall short of justification due to luck. Moreover, (...) it is argued that justification-undermining luck is a problem for both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. Accordingly, it is shown that epistemic luck is a more widespread phenomenon than many in epistemology commonly assume. (shrink)

The lottery problem is the problem of explaining why mere reflection on the long odds that one will lose the lottery does not yield knowledge that one will lose. More generally, it is the problem of explaining why true beliefs merely formed on the basis of statistical evidence do not amount to knowledge. Some have thought that the lottery problem can be solved by appeal to a violation of the safety principle for knowledge, i.e., the principle that if S knows (...) that p, not easily would S have believed that p without p being the case. Against the standard safety‐based solution, I argue that understanding safe belief as belief that directly covaries with the truth of what is believed in a suitably defined set of possible worlds forces safety theorists to make a series of theoretical choices that ultimately prevent a satisfactory solution to the problem. In this way, I analyze several safety principles that result from such choices—the paper thus gives valuable insights into the nature of safety—and explain why none solves the lottery problem, including their inability to explain away Gettierized lottery cases. On a more positive note, I show that there is a viable solution in terms of safety if we get rid of the unquestioned assumption that safe beliefs directly track the truth. The alternative is a conception of safe belief according to which what safe beliefs directly track is the appropriateness of the circumstances and, indirectly, the truth. The resulting safety principle, I argue, explains why mere statistical evidence is not a safe source of knowledge. (shrink)

Functionalism as a philosophical position has been recently applied to the case of emotion research. However, a number of objections have been raised against applying such a view to scientific theorizing on emotions. In this article, I argue that functionalism is still a viable strategy for emotion research. To do this, I present functionalism in philosophy of mind and offer a sketch of its application to emotions. I then discuss three recent objections raised against it and respond to each of (...) them. These objections claim that functionalism is intractable because (i) it does not support a scientifically interesting taxonomy of emotions for experimental settings, (ii) it is inherently teleological, and (iii) it cannot be falsified. I argue that these objections either rely on a simplified version of functionalism as a philosophical position or they pose challenges that functionalists can readily address. Lastly, I conclude by drawing some lessons these objections suggest for a tractable functionalist account of emotions. (shrink)

The traditional view of lying says that lying is a matter of intending to deceive others by making statements that one believes to be false. Jennifer Lackey has recently defended the following version of the traditional view: A lies to B just in case (i) A states that p to B, (ii) A believes that p is false and (iii) A intends to be deceptive to B in stating that p. I argue that, despite all the virtues that Lackey ascribes (...) to her view, conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are not sufficient for lying. (shrink)

In what sense do groups have beliefs? This paper provides a novel answer to this question by combining pluralism and summativism about group belief. The resulting view is called pluralistic summativism. The paper starts by critically assessing the three main debates in the literature—the disputes between monism and pluralism, summativism and non-summativism, and believism and rejectionism—and draws a general methodological lesson for the summativism/non-summativism debate—namely, that intuitions about cases alone are not enough to adjudicate between views of group belief, and (...) that the debate would benefit from a reflective equilibrium approach. All of this serves as motivation for the novel pluralist and summative view, which has some advantages, for example, when it comes to moral evaluation. (shrink)

Este artículo reconstruye algunas líneas fundamentales que componen el programa filosófico-político del ordoliberalismo y su impacto en el proceso de integración europea. En él, se analizan las consecuencias éticas y políticas de las ideas ordoliberales relativas al papel del Estado y la función del mercado a través de sus figuras y nociones claves. Además, se elabora un diagnóstico de la matriz ordoliberal que inspira la política de la Unión Europea desde la perspectiva de un nuevo constitucionalismo disciplinario cuyo objetivo es (...) desvincular las políticas nacionales del control democrático y social mediante su atribución a marcos jurídicos de carácter supranacionales. (shrink)

I offered the title for this paper before family separations were on the news, before the president had brought attention to the exodus of migrants, and before the government shutdown in response to the request of billions of dollars to build a border wall.1 I had no idea how common immigration would be in everyday conversation. By the time you read this, I am sure there will be other worrisome news. Perhaps we will still be thinking about immigration, or we (...) might have moved on.I have been intrigued, however, as to what this intensified public discussion of the threats of immigration reveals about the self-image of the United States, and the racial and religious ideas that undergird that... (shrink)

In almost any domain of endeavour, successes can be attained through skill, but also by dumb luck. An archer’s wildest shots occasionally hit the target. Against enormous odds, some fair lottery tickets happen to win. The same goes in the case of purely cognitive or intellectual endeavours. As inquirers, we characteristically aim to believe truly rather than falsely, and to attain such standings as knowledge and understanding. Sometimes such aims are attained with commendable competence, but of course, not always. Epistemic (...) luck is a species of luck which features in circumstances where a given cognitive success—in the broadest sense, some form of cognitive contact with reality—is attained in a manner that is interestingly lucky—viz., chancy, accidental or beyond our control. In the paradigmatic case, this involves the formation of a belief that is luckily true, and where the subject plausibly deserves little credit for having gotten things right. Although the literature on epistemic luck has focused predominantly on the relationship between luck and propositional knowledge—which is widely taken to exclude luck—epistemologists are increasingly exploring the compatibility of epistemic luck with other kinds of epistemic standings, such as knowledge-how and understanding. (shrink)

In a series of papers, Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard argue that the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive success because of cognitive ability (robust virtue epistemology) is incompatible with the idea that whether or not an agent’s true belief amounts to knowledge can significantly depend upon factors beyond her cognitive agency (epistemic dependence). In particular, certain purely modal facts seem to preclude knowledge, while the contribution of other agents’ cognitive abilities seems to enable it. Kallestrup and Pritchard’s arguments are (...) targeted against views that hold that all it takes to manifest one’s cognitive agency is to properly exercise one’s belief-forming abilities. I offer an account of the notion of cognitive ability according to which our epistemic resources are not exhausted by abilities to produce true beliefs as outputs, but also include dispositions to stop belief-formation when actual or modal circumstances are not suitable for it (precautionary cognitive abilities). Knowledge, I argue, can be accordingly conceived as a cognitive success that is also due to the latter. The resulting version of robust virtue epistemology helps explain how purely modal facts as well as other agents’ cognitive abilities may have a bearing on the manifestation of one’s cognitive agency, which shows in turn that robust virtue epistemology and epistemic dependence are not incompatible after all. (shrink)

Desde la Antigüedad hasta nuestros días, los historiadores de la filosofía han criticado, reformulado y asentido a diversas tesis en torno a las implicaciones que ha tenido la categoría de naturaleza en el pensamiento de los filósofos -y filósofas- antiguos, medievales y modernos. A pesar de las dificultades que implica una investigación históricamente tan extensa, lo que resulta evidente de la categoría de naturaleza es su carácter plurívoco, ya que el concepto, en tanto categoría filosófica, ha sufrido múltiples transformaciones con (...) el paso del tiempo. En el presente trabajo, se intentará echar luz sobre dichas transformaciones en el marco de una perspectiva histórica y filosófica. (shrink)

Suppose an inquiring group wants to let a certain view stand as the group's view. But there’s a problem: the individuals in that group do not initially all agree with one another about what the correct view is. What should the group do, given that it wants to settle on a single answer, in the face of this kind of intragroup disagreement? Should the group members deliberate and exchange evidence and then take a vote? Or, given the well-known ways that (...) evidence exchange can go wrong, e.g., by exacerbating pre-existing biases, compromising the independence of individual judgments, etc., should the group simply take a vote without deliberating at all? While this question has multiple dimensions to it—including ethical and political dimensions—we approach the question through an epistemological lens. In particular, we investigate to what extent it is epistemically advantageous and disadvantageous that groups whose members disagree over some issue use deliberation in comparison to voting as a way to reach collective agreements. Extant approaches in the literature to this ‘deliberation versus voting’ comparison typically assume there is some univocal answer as to which group strategy is best, epistemically. We think this assumption is mistaken. We approach the deliberation versus voting question from a pluralist perspective, in that we hold that a group’s collective endeavor to solve an internal dispute can be aimed at different, albeit not necessarily incompatible, epistemic goals, namely the goals of truth, evidence, understanding, and epistemic justice. Different answers to our guiding question, we show, correspond with different epistemic goals. We conclude by exploring several ways to mitigate the potential epistemic disadvantages of solving intragroup disagreement by means of deliberation in relation to each epistemic goal. (shrink)

I argue that Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology is insufficient for knowledge. I show that Pritchard fails to achieve the aim that motivates his adoption of a virtue-theoretic condition in the first place: to guarantee the appropriate direction of fit that known beliefs have. Finally, I examine whether other virtue-theoretic accounts are able to explain what I call the direction of fit problem.

In a recent article in this journal, Wolfgang Freitag argues that Gettier-style cases that are based on the notion of “distant” epistemic luck cannot be ruled out as cases of knowledge by modal conditions such as safety or sensitivity. I argue that safety and sensitivity can be easily fixed and that Freitag provides no convincing reason for the existence of “distant” epistemic luck.

En el presente artículo nos enfocare-mos en desarrollar las concepciones antropológicas de dos autores renacen-tistas: Marsilio Ficino y Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. En este sentido, nuestro recorrido parte de las lectu-ras propias de diversas obras de ambos autores, pero prestando especial interés en De vita libri tres de Ficino y en Oratio de hominis dignitate de Pico. En ellas nuestros autores destacan la importancia de una concep-ción antropológica regida por los ideales humanistas del Renacimiento y cómo éstas son atravesadas por (...) di-versas categorías paganas en general y herméticas en particular. Así pues, nuestro trabajo tendrá dos objetivos principales, por un lado desarrollar las concepciones antropológicas de ambos autores expuestas en las obras antes mencionadas; y por otro, demostrar cómo aun partiendo de las mismas categorías de análisis –copula mundi and magnum miraculum–, nuestros autores pueden arribar a concepciones del hombre disímiles entre sí; a saber, el hombre como microcosmos en la filosofía ficiniana y el hombre en tanto indeterminación en el pensamiento piquiano. (shrink)

Facing the progress of science and technology, Hans Jonas believes that traditional ethical theories are insufficient to guide the actions of contemporary man. To formulate his own theory, the philosopher takes as its basis the responsibilities of parents towards their children and the one the public man has in relation with his community. Despite their differences, these forms of liability are intertwined and complementary. Then arise in jonas' theory the concepts of wholeness, continuity and future, which will cover following the (...) thinking of the philosopher. (shrink)